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a b s t r a c t
Web services providing E-commerce capabilities to support busi-
ness transactions over the Internet aremore andmorewidespread.
The development of such services involves several security issues
ranging from authentication to the management of the access to
shared resources according to a given business model. The capa-
bility of validating designs against fast evolving requirements is of
paramount importance for the adaptation of business models to
changing regulations and rapidly evolving market needs. So, tech-
niques for the specification and automated analysis of web services
to be used in security-sensitive applications are crucial in the de-
velopment of these systems.
In this paper, we propose an extension of the relational
transducers introduced by Abiteboul, Vianu, Fordham, and Yesha
for the specification of the transaction protocols of web services
and their security properties. We investigate the decidability of
relevant verification problems such as goal reachability (for the
validation of use-case scenarios) and log validation (for detecting
frauds) and provide sufficient conditions for their decidability. The
extension we propose is two-fold. First, we add constraints to
specify the algebraic structure of the resources manipulated by the
transducers. Second, recursion is allowed (only) in policy rules to
express important policy idioms such as delegation. Technically,
decidability is obtained by a reduction to a decidable class of first-
order formulae and fix-point computation to handle recursion.
© 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Context. Service-Oriented Computing (SOC) has received and is still receiving a lot of attention from
industries because it is regarded as the approach to help systems remain scalable and flexible while
growing, and to also help bridge the gap between Business and Information Technology. SOC is
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a computation paradigm where applications can be given a standard interface and be stored in a
searchable on-line repository as reusable units for composition. SOC does not require the integration
of components and code into one computing environment; instead, it requires the specification of
data exchanges so that the final result can be produced by exploiting the results of the cooperating
services. This loosely coupled architecture makes platform-independent computing possible.
The need for security-aware E-services. Web Services are widely regarded as the way SOC should
be realized in practice. A web service is a piece of software with a clearly defined interface
that can be invoked via a network, usually the Internet. Web services providing E-commerce
capabilities to support business transactions between several parties over the Internet are more and
more widespread. The development of such services involves several security issues ranging from
authentication to the management of the access to shared resources according to a given business
model. The capability of validating designs against fast evolving requirements is of paramount
importance for the adaptation of businessmodels to changing regulations and rapidly evolvingmarket
needs. So, techniques for the specification and automated analysis of dependable web services to be
used in security-sensitive applications (such as E-commerce, E-health, and E-governance) are crucial
in the development of these systems.
Relational transducers (Abiteboul et al., 2000) have been proposed to model the transaction
behaviour of E-services for E-commerce and to allow for the analysis of the underlying transaction
protocols. Roughly, a relational transducer is a machine capable of translating an input sequence of
relations into an output sequence of relations; its state being a relational database. A particular class
of relational transducers, called semi-positive cumulative (spocus) transducers, has been identified
and studied because its specification is declarative and simple to understand, and some interesting
verification problems turn out to be decidable (see again Abiteboul et al. (2000)). The input–output
mapping in spocus transducers is implicitly defined by a set of non-recursive (variants of) Datalog
rules. Among other results, the decidability of the following two verification problem for spocus
transducers is proposed in Abiteboul et al. (2000): goal reachability and log validity. The former consists
in asking if some goal can be achieved by some run of the transducer and is the formal counterpart of
a sanity check on the design of the E-service. The latter consists of checking if there exists a sequence
of inputs that generates a certain log (i.e. a projection of a possible execution of a run) and it is the
formal basis for frauddetection. To understandhow, consider the situationwhere a certain customer is
allowed to run locally the supplier’s E-service for convenience or efficiency reasons. To detect possible
frauds, the supplier is provided with a log of the run (which should be as compact as possible) and is
left with the task of checking that the log is compliant with its business model, implemented in the
E-service.
Towards security-aware transition-based services. Although spocus transducers support declarative
high-level specifications and some interesting verification problems are decidable (thereby paving
the way to automated analysis tools), one of their major shortcomings is the lack of support for the
specification and verification of the algebraic structures of the data and resourcesmanipulated during
their operation. For example, it is difficult (if not impossible) to specify that certain tasks should be
executed only if a certain input value is below a certain amount. In other words, it is not possible to
precisely specify how the control flowof a spocus transducer is influencedby the values of certain data.
Spocus transducers must resort to coarser abstractions where tasks, which are to be executed under
certain conditions, are modelled as non-deterministic activities. Sometimes, this lack of precision
prevent the verification of certain properties which crucially depend both on the data-flow and the
control-flow of the application.
A first contribution of the paper is an extension of the spocus transducers, that we call constraint
spocus transducers, to overcome this problem. In particular, we augment the rules for input–output of
spocus transducers with a set of non-recursive constraint Datalog rules for expressing more precisely
the algebraic structures of the data and the resources manipulated by the transducers. In this way, it
is possible to specify the interplay between the control-flow and the data-flow of the applications,
and verify more interesting properties. Technically, the absence of recursive rules allows us to
derive decidability results for some important verification problems of constraint spocus transducers
(namely, the goal reachability and the log validity problems) by using a reduction to the satisfiability
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problem in an extension of the Bernays–Schönfinkel–Ramsey (BSR) class (Ramsey, 1930). Formally,
we introduce the notion of BSR(T )-sentences, i.e. formulae built out of constant and predicate symbols
only (as it is the case of formulae of the BSR class) that may also contain symbols from a theory
T . The second contribution of this paper is to find sufficient conditions on the theory T to derive
the decidability of BSR(T )-sentences. Our proof is constructive and is based on a combination of an
instantiation-based procedure with satisfiability solving of quantifier-free formulae in the extension
of the theory T with uninterpreted predicate symbols. The intuition is that T should allow one to
consider only finitely many instances of the universally quantified variables of a BSR(T )-sentence
while preserving completeness. That is to identify a class of theories forwhich BSR(T )-sentences admit
a finite domain, as it is the case for BSR formulae. It turns out that locally finite theories (Ghilardi,
2004) belong to this class. Since the satisfiability of BSR(T )-sentences can be of interest also for other
verification problems, not related to the analysis of the transducers considered in this paper, it is
possible to read only the part of the paper required to understand the statement and the proof of
the decidability of the satisfiability problem of BSR(T )-sentences (see the plan of the paper below for
details).
Although constraint spocus transducers are a significant extension with respect to the spocus
transducers in Abiteboul et al. (2000), applications for E-commerce depend crucially on security
requirements for their correct operation. In particular, access control constraints are fundamental to
many security properties of business transactions. In fact, failure to meet authorization constraints
may cause economic losses andmay even have legal implications. The specification andmanagement
of access control policies is a challenging problem and designers have few or no tools to assist
them. As a result, a large number of security breaches are caused by policy misconfigurations and
designers are often reluctant to modify policy settings, as they do not have confidence in whether the
resulting policy configurations indeed enforce the policy objectives. These difficulties in changing the
access control part are a major obstacle to the flexibility required by the design of security-sensitive
transaction-based web services for E-commerce.
Several access control languages are rooted in the class of constraint Datalog languages (Li
and Mitchell, 2003a). In particular, many access control patterns can be declaratively specified by
using recursive rules (Becker and Nanz, 2008; Becker, 2005). In order to specify the access control
policies which are important for E-commerce applications, we introduce the notion of security-aware
transducer which is a refinement of that of constraint spocus transducer where (possibly recursive)
constraint Datalog rules may be used to model a variety of access control mechanisms and the
way they influence the control-flow of the application. Indeed, the decidability of the verification
problems (i.e. goal reachability and log validity) for the new class of transducers requires a non-trivial
extension of the technique to reduce such problems to the satisfiability of BSR(T )-sentences. The
idea is to find sufficient conditions for the termination of the fix-point computation underlying the
semantics of the constraint Datalog rules (see, e.g., Li and Mitchell (2003a) and Toman (1997)). If this
computation terminates and the result is a BSR(T )-sentence, we can use a reduction that is similar to
that in Abiteboul et al. (2000).
Unfortunately, the sufficient conditions identified for the termination of the fix-point computation
of the constraint Datalog rules are a bit too restrictive for some constraint domains of interest in
applications. The problem is that one of the requirements to be able to compute with constraint
Datalog rules is that the underlying constraint domain admits quantifier elimination. The key
observation is that there are few theories admitting quantifier elimination that also satisfy the
sufficient condition for termination. A third contribution of the paper is to study how to overcome
this restriction by using the notion of model completeness (see, e.g., Chang and Keisler (1990)), which
permits to use theories that satisfy the conditions for termination and their model completion for
eliminating quantifiers. This is justified by the observation that T∗ |= ϕ iff T |= ϕ, for every universally
quantified formula ϕ, where |= is the standard logical consequence relation of first-order logic, T is a
theory, and T∗ is its model completion.
On the necessity of constraints and recursion for policies. The reader may wonder if the use of recursive
constraint Datalog rules can be avoided. For example, one may think of approximating policies by
bounding the depth of the recursion so that an obvious transformation to a set of non-recursive rules
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is possible and then one can re-use the techniques in Abiteboul et al. (2000). We argue here that these
features are worth the trouble. Consider the following two observations. First, constraints are needed
to describe policy rules as advocated in Li and Mitchell (2003a) so that a reduction to an extension
of the BSR (with constraint) must be designed and – more importantly – sufficient conditions for
the decidability of the satisfiability problem must be identified. Second, a verification that takes into
account only an approximation of the rules does not permit the reuse of sets of policy rules in different
(although similar) situations. Being able to re-use,modify, or adapt existing policy sets is of paramount
importance to limit security breaches caused by policy misconfigurations and to match the flexibility
and the rapidly changing requirements of E-services. One of the keys to achieve this objective is the
availability of a flexible analysis technique that allows one to verify the adequacy of a set of policy rules
in the most general design scenario. We believe that the contributions in this paper take a significant
first step in this direction.
Related work. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first extension of the spocus transducers that
takes into account security features. In fact, the work in Spielmann (2000) extends the expressiveness
of spocus transducers whereby their states are not necessarily cumulative and guards of the
transactions are arbitrary first-order formulae and not simply conjunctions of atoms (as it is the
case for spocus transducers). However, since recursion is forbidden also in Spielmann (2000), its
decidability results cannot be directly applied to the security-aware transducers considered in this
paper. In Meyrovich et al. (2006), an extension of the transducers of Spielmann (2000) are used to
specify the security policies of a web-based conference management tool. That paper focuses on the
extensions to Spielmann (2000) needed to naturally specify policy composition rather than on the
decidability of the resulting verification problems. It would be interesting to study how much of the
conference management tool specified in Meyrovich et al. (2006) can be specified with the security-
aware transducers proposed in this paper. The spocus transducers of Abiteboul et al. (2000) are used
inKohli and Lobo (2003) to specify the semantics of a language that is intended to describe thenetwork
control policies. However, the kind of policies considered in that paper do not concern security or
access control but are rather related to the sequencing of the actions that participants in a protocol
must execute to comply with a given protocol. Furthermore, in that paper, only a very limited form
of iteration (that is quite restricted compared to our use of recursion) is needed. Another difference is
that no decidability results are derived, rather the interest is in using the high-level specifications to
synthesize controllers, at the network level, for monitoring the progress of the protocol activities. An
earlier version of the results contained in this paper has appeared in Ranise (2009).
Plan of the paper. Section 2 introduces some background notions on first-order logic and constraint
Datalog rules. Section 3 defines constraint spocus transducers, formally defines two verification
problems (goal reachability and log validity) for the new class of transducers, and proves their
decidability. Section 4 introduces the class of BSR(T )-sentences and proves the decidability of its
satisfiability problem under suitable assumptions on the theory T . Section 5 adds recursion to
constraint spocus transducers for the specification of access control policies and provides sufficient
conditions for the decidability of the related verification problems. Section 6 concludes and gives some
directions for future work.
As a running example,we use the loan origination process adapted fromSchaad et al. (2006), which
is typical of a large class of E-services: Example 1 specifies the workflow of the process by means of
a constraint spocus transducer and Example 2 extends it with the specification of an access control
engine for authorization constraints by using a security-aware transducer.
For those interested only in the decidability of the satisfiability problem of BSR(T )-sentences, it
is possible to read part of the preliminaries (Section 2, omitting the last paragraph ‘‘Datalog and
constraints’’) and proceed to Section 4 where the decidability of the satisfiability problem of BSR(T )-
sentences is stated and proved.
2. Preliminaries
We assume familiarity with the basic syntactic and semantic notions of first-order logic (see,
e.g., Enderton (1972)) and Datalog (see, e.g., Li and Mitchell (2003a)).
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We consider first-order logic with equality where the symbol = is a logical constant which
is always interpreted as the equality relation. A constraint is a (finite) conjunction of literals. An
expression is a term, an atom, a literal, or a formula. A Σ(x)-expression is an expression built out of
the symbols in a signature Σ where at most the variables in the sequence x may occur free, and we
write E(x) to emphasize that E is a Σ(x)-expression. (By abuse of notation, we consider sequences
also as finite sets and use the standard set-theoretic operations to combine them.) For two disjoint
sequences of variables x and y, wewrite E(x, y) to denote theΣ(z)-expression built out of the symbols
inΣ where at most the variables in z may occur free, where z is the concatenation of x and y. Let x and
y be two disjoint sequences of variables and σ be a substitution defined on the variables in y; then yσ
is the tuple of terms obtained by the simultaneous application of σ to the variables in y and E(x, yσ)
is the expression obtained from E by the pairwise replacement of the variables in y with the terms
in yσ .
TheBernays–Schönfinkel–Ramsey (BSR) class (Ramsey, 1930) is a class of first-order formulaewhose
satisfiability (or, equivalently, validity) is well-known to be decidable (i.e., there exists an algorithm
capable of establishing if any formula in BSR is satisfiable or not). A formula of the BSR class is of the
form ∃x.∀y.ϕ(x, y), where x, y are (disjoint) tuples of variables and ϕ is a quantifier-free formula built
out of a signature containing only predicate and constant symbols (i.e. no function symbol occurs in
ϕ). When checking the satisfiability of ∃x.∀y.ϕ(x, y), we can equivalently consider the satisfiability of
the formula ∀y.ϕ(x, y), where the symbols in x are considered to be free constants.
LetΣ be a signature. AΣ-structureN is a sub-structure of aΣ-structureM iff the domain ofN is
contained in the domain ofM and the interpretations of the symbols ofΣ inN are restrictions of the
interpretations of these symbols inM. A class CL ofΣ-structures is closed under sub-structures iff for
every structureM ∈ CL, ifN is a substructure ofM thenN ∈ CL.
LetΣ andΣ ′ be two signatures such thatΣ ⊆ Σ ′. IfM is aΣ ′-structure, thenM|Σ is the reduct
ofM obtained fromM by forgetting the interpretations of the symbols inΣ ′ \Σ .
First-order theories and Satisfiability Modulo Theories problems. LetΣ be a signature. AΣ-theory T is a
set ofΣ-sentences. For example, for any signatureΣ , the empty theory is the theory of equality; also
called equality with uninterpreted function symbols, EUF, in the literature. Any set of BSR formulae
is a theory over the signature containing the predicate symbols (and constant symbols) occurring in
them; for this reason, we may also use the term ‘BSR theory’ for a set of formulae in the BSR class.
A Σ-theory T identifies a class Mod(T ) of Σ-structures, that are models of all sentences in T . In the
following, we assume that Mod(T ) ≠ ∅ (and we say that T is consistent), for each theory T considered
in this paper.
A Σ-formula ϕ(x) is T -satisfiable iff there exists a Σ-structure M ∈ Mod(T ) (also called a Σ-
model) such that M |= ∃x.ϕ(x). The satisfiability modulo theory T (in symbols, SMT(T )) problem
consists of establishing the T -satisfiability of any quantifier-freeΣ-formula. A formula ϕ(x) is T -valid
if the negation of its existential closure, namely ¬∃x.ϕ(x), is T -unsatisfiable. Two formulae ϕ and ψ
are T -equivalent iff the formula ϕ ↔ ψ is T -valid.
AΣ-theory T is locally finite ifΣ is finite and, for every set of constants a, there are finitely many
ground terms t1, . . . , tka , called representatives, such that for every ground (Σ ∪ a)-term u, we have
T |= u = ti for some i. If the representatives are effectively computable from a and ti is computable
from u, then T is effectively locally finite. For simplicity, we will often say ‘‘locally finite’’ to mean
‘‘effectively locally finite.’’ A theory T admits quantifier elimination if for an arbitrary formula ϕ(x)
(possibly containing quantifiers), one can compute a T -equivalent quantifier-free formula ϕ′(x).
Datalog and constraints. A Datalog formula is a BSR formula of the form
∀x, y.
n
i=1
Ai(x, y)→ A0(x) also written as a rule
A0(x) ← A1(x, y), . . . , An(x, y)
where Ai is an atom (for i = 0, 1, . . . , n) and x, y are disjoint tuples of variables. Furthermore, A0 is
called the head,
n
i=1 Ai(x, y) the body of the rule, and when n = 0, the Datalog rule is also called a
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fact. A set of semi-positive Datalog formulae is a set of BSR formulae of the form
∀x, y.
n
i=1
[¬]Ai(x, y)→ A0(x) also written as a rule
A0(x) ← [¬]A1(x, y), . . . , [¬]An(x, y)
where x, y are disjoint tuples of variables, A0 is an atom (called, as above, the head of the rule), [¬] Ai
is a possibly negated atom for i = 1, . . . , n (ni=1[¬]Ai is called, as above, the body of the rule), and
whenever a negated atom appears in the body of a rule, the predicate symbol of this literal is not the
predicate symbol of any atom which is the head of a rule in the set.
Let P be a set of Datalog rules and p, q two predicate symbols in P . We say that p refers to q if
there exists a Datalog rule ρ in P such that p is in the head of ρ and q is in its body. A set of Datalog
rules is recursive (non-recursive) if the relation ‘refers to’ is cyclic (acyclic, resp.), i.e. there is (no, resp.)
p1, . . . , pn such that ‘p1 refers to p2 refers to ... pn−1 refers to pn’ and p1 = pn. Semantically, a set
of (semi-positive) Datalog rules admits a least Herbrand model which can be obtained by taking the
intersection of all its Herbrand models.
It is possible to consider a family of logic programming languages, which goes under the names
of Constraint Datalog, by permitting the occurrence of constraints over a computation domain (other
than the Herbrand domain) in the body of rules. Formally, let T be a Σ-theory. A constraint Datalog
rule is a formula of the form
∀x, y.ξ (x, y) ∧
n
i=1
Ai(x, y)→ A0(x) also written as
A0(x) ← A1(x, y), . . . , An(x, y), ξ(x, y)
where Ai is an atom (for i = 0, 1, . . . , n), ξ(x, y) is a quantifier-free Σ(x, y)-formula, called the
constraint of the rule, and x, y are disjoint tuples of variables; when n = 0, the constraint Datalog
rule is also called a constraint fact. A set of semi-positive constraint Datalog rules is a set of formulae of
the form
∀x, y.ξ (x, y) ∧
n
i=1
[¬]Ai(x, y)→ A0(x) also written as a rule
A0(x) ← [¬]A1(x, y), . . . , [¬]An(x, y), ξ(x, y)
where x, y are disjoint tuples of variables, ξ(x, y) is a quantifier-free Σ(x, y)-formula, A0 is an atom
(called, as above, the head of the rule), [¬] Ai is a possibly negated atom for i = 1, . . . , n (ni=1[¬]Ai
is called, as above, the body of the rule), and whenever a negated atom appears in the body of a rule,
then the predicate symbol of this literal is not the predicate symbol of any atomwhich is the head of a
rule in the set. A set S of constraint Datalog rules is recursive if the set of Datalog rules obtained from S
by deleting the constraints is so. Let S be a set of constraint Datalog rules, it is standard to assume that
the set of predicate symbols in the heads and the bodies of the rules in S is disjoint from the signature
Σ of the constraints in S.
We remark that the definition of a constraint Datalog rule is a generalization of that usually found
in the logic programming literature. In fact, instead of a class of structures (as it is the case with our
definition), constraint Datalog focuses on just one structure chosen as the domain of computation
according to the usual practice followed in logic programming (see, e.g., Li and Mitchell (2003a)).
This kind of generalization of the constraint logic programming paradigm has already been studied
in the literature, e.g., Smolka (1989) and Tinelli and Harandi (1998), where it is explained that both
the logical, the operational, and the fix-point semantics can be straightforwardly extended to deal
with classes of structures rather than a single one. Finally, notice that ξ can be an arbitrary Boolean
combination of atoms in the theory since we use constraint Datalog rules to write specifications that
are not intended to be executable, thereby the efficiency in solving queries in linear or polynomial
time is less stringent.
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3. Spocus transducers with constraints
Roughly, relational transducers (Abiteboul et al., 2000) define state machines that take as input a
sequence of relations and produce as output another sequence of relations. Formally,2 a relational
transducer schema is a tuple TS := (input, state, output, db, log), where each element of TS is a
finite set of predicate symbols (of first-order logic); input , state, output , and db are pairwise disjoint
and log ⊆ input ∪ output . Let TS be a relational transducer schema. The first-order signature Σ
associated to TS contains all the predicate symbols in the components of TS and countably many
constant symbols. Given a countably infinite set Dom of elements, called the domain of TS, we define
a Σ-structure (Dom, I) such that I puts in a one-to-one correspondence the constants of Σ and the
elements ofDom. We say that I(r) is an instance of the predicate symbol r inΣ and that the instance is
finite if the set I(r) of tuples is so. If X is a finite set of predicate symbols, an instance I of X is the set of
instances of all r ∈ X . A relational transducer (with underlying domain Dom, which is usually omitted
because of the one-to-one association with the set of constants inΣ) is a triple (TS, σ , ω), where σ –
called the state transition function – is a mapping from the Cartesian product of the instances of input ,
of state, and of db to instances of state, and ω – called the output function – is a mapping from the
Cartesian product of the instances of input , of state, and of db to instances of output . A transducer is
run over a (not necessarily finite) sequence I1, I2, . . . , In, . . . of finite instances of input . The results are
three sequences: a sequence of instances of state S1, S2, . . . , Sn, . . ., a sequence of instances of output
O1,O2, . . . ,On, . . ., and a sequence of instances of log L1, L2, . . . , Ln, . . . where Si = σ(Ii, Si−1,D),
Oi = ω(Ii, Si−1,D), and Li = (Ii∪Oi)|log (i.e. Li is obtained from Ii∪Oi by considering only the instances
of log and deleting the others), D is an instance of db, and S0 is empty.
We are left with the problem of specifying both the state transition and the output function.
In Abiteboul et al. (2000), a particular class of relational transducers, called spocus transducers, is
introduced where the state transition is cumulative (i.e. tuples in the input relations are stored as
soon as they are submitted to the transducer) and the output transition is specified by means of a
class of Datalog programs whose rules have bodies where relations from input or statemay occur and
heads where relation in output will occur.
Definition 1 (Constraint Spocus Transducer). Let S := (input, state, output , db, log) be a transducer
schema and T be aΣ-theory with decidable SMT (T ) problem such thatΣ ∩X = ∅ for X a component
of S. A constraint spocus transducer is a relational transducer (S, σ , ω) such that state = {past_R|
R ∈ input}where past_R has the same arity as R and for every finite instance It of input , finite instance
St of state, finite instance D of db, and integer t ≥ 1, we have
• σ(It , St−1,D)(past_R) = St−1(past_R) ∪ It(R), for each R ∈ input;
• ω(It , St−1,D) is defined by a finite set Ω of constraint Datalog rules that are semi-positive and
non-recursive and such that their heads contain only predicate symbols from output , their bodies
contain predicate symbols from input ∪ state ∪ db, and a quantifier-freeΣ-formula as constraint.
(The semantics of Ω is the standard one for constraint semi-positive Datalog programs, see,
e.g., Toman (1997).)
By taking T to be the empty theory, it is easy to see that our notion of transducer reduces to that
of Spocus transducer in Abiteboul et al. (2000). To understand why what we have just defined is a
transducer, observe that a set of (constraint) semi-positive and non-recursive Datalog rules can be
seen as a mapping of instances of the relations occurring in the bodies of the rules to instances of the
relations occurring in their heads (see, e.g., den Bussche (2000) for details). As an example, consider
the following finite instances {g1, g2} and {(g1, p1), (g2, p2), (g3, p3)} of the unary relation order and
the binary relation price, respectively, where gi is the identifier of some good and pi is its price. Then,
the (semi-positive and non-recursive) Datalog rule
bill(x, y) ← order(x), price(x, y)
2 We present here a slightly simplified notion of relational transducer and related notions which are sufficient for our
purposes. The reader interested in the more general characterization is pointed to Abiteboul et al. (2000).
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Fig. 1. A loan origination process.
defines the following finite instance of the relation bill: {(g1, p1), (g2, p2)}. Now, if we consider the
finite instance {g1} of the relation order and the same instance of the binary relation price, the Datalog
rule above defines the following instance of the relation bill: {(g1, p1)}. In general, given the finite
instances of order and price, the Datalog rule implicitly defines an associated instance of the relation
bill. In this perspective, we can consider the constraint (Datalog) rules in Ω as defining a mapping
between instances of input ∪ state ∪ db to instances of output ∪ state.
To illustrate how the transducer introduced here extends the capabilities of those defined in
Abiteboul et al. (2000), we consider an example.
Example 1. Business models are frequently specified as workflows where various tasks involved in
a complex process are coordinated. A typical example is a loan origination process such as the one
considered in Schaad et al. (2006) and an adaptation ofwhich is informally specified on the left of Fig. 1.
The process starts with the input of the customer’s data (rcv), consisting of a (unique) identifier C for a
customer and the amount L of the loan. Afterwards, a contract for the current customer C is prepared
(prc) while the customer’s rating evaluation takes place concurrently. The rating enables the bank to
determine whether the customer can be granted the requested loan. At this point, the execution may
follow different paths: if the amount of the loan is less than 10 KEuros, then an internal rating suffices
(int); otherwise the internal rating is followed by an external evaluation (ext) carried out by a third-
party financial institution. The rating activities can be abstractly modelled as queries to databases,
either an internal one (dbi) or an external one (dbe), according to which task int or ext is executed.
Both databases store the expected amount M of money that a customer C can borrow without risk
and, for simplicity, are assumed to be constant during the entire execution of the workflow. The loan
request must then be approved or refused (dec) by the bank. Subsequently, if the customer and the
bank have reached an agreement, the contract is signed (sgn). Notice that the execution of a task
may affect the state of the process. For example, dec modifies the state of the execution by issuing a
statement asserting if the proposed product is suitable or not for the customer (encoded as ok or nok,
respectively). Finally, the whole process may be closed (end).
In the following, we show how the workflow of the loan origination process can be formally
specified by means of a constraint spocus transducer. We consider a transducer schema S :=
(input, state, output, db, log), where input := {rcv, prc, int, ext , dec , sgn, end}, state := {past_P|P ∈
input} (sometimes we will abbreviate past_P with p_P for P ∈ input), output := {lop}, db :=
{dbi, dbe}, and log = output . Intuitively, the predicate symbols in input represent the various tasks
in the process, whose execution is recorded by those in state, the predicate symbols in db represent
databases which are assumed constant over the entire execution of the workflow, and the predicate
symbol lop in output denotes the fact that a certain task, associated to a given customer C asking
for a loan of amount L, has been executed. The constraint spocus transducer formalizing the loan
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Table 1
A simple run of the security-aware spocus transducer of Fig. 1.
Time 1 2 3 4 5 6
Input rcv(i1, 15),rcv(i2, 150)
prc(i1, 15),
int(i1, 15),
prc(i2, 150),
int(i2, 150)
ext(i2, 150) dec(i2, 150, ok) sgn(i2, 150) end(i2, 150)
Output lop(i1, 15, t1),lop(i2, 15, t2)
lop(i1, 15, t2),
lop(i2, 150, t2),
lop(i2, 150, t3)
lop(i2, 150, t4) lop(i2, 150, t5) lop(i2, 150, t6) lop(i2, 150, t7)
Instance of dbi: {(i1, 10), (i2, 200)} Instance of dbe: {(i1, 10), (i2, 180)}.
origination process is the tuple (S, σ , ω), where – according to Definition 1 – σ is a function that
adds the finite instances of the predicate symbols in input to the finite instances of the relations in
state (e.g., if the finite instance {(i1, 15)} of the relation rvc in input is presented as an input at time
step t , then the tuple (i1, 15) will be added to the finite instance of the relation past_rvc in state at
time step t + 1 for t ≥ 0) while ω is induced by the semi-positive and non-recursive constraint
Datalog rules in the right part of Fig. 1. It is also necessary to identify the theory T from which the
numerals and the symbols>,≥ occurring in the rules (intended to be integers with their usual strict
and weak ordering relations) are taken. To this end, we assume a theory T of linear orders where the
numerals are interpreted in the usual way,≥ is assumed to be a transitive, reflexive, anti-symmetric,
and total binary relation, and > is its strict version. (Notice that no finite set of non-recursive semi-
positive Datalog rules exists corresponding to the four rules in Fig. 1 containing constraints.) We are
now ready to describe how the rules in Fig. 1 define the functionω on a possible run of the transducer,
shown in Table 1. To simplify the discussion, in the table and the rest of the example, we write p(c) to
indicate that the tuple c belongs to the finite instance of the relation p; e.g., rcv(i1, 15) indicates that
the tuple (i1, 15) belongs to the finite instance of rcv. Initially (i.e. at time step 0), the finite instance
of each relation in input ∪ state ∪ output ∪ log is empty, the finite instance of dbi is assumed to
be {(i1, 10), (i2, 200)} and that of dbe to be {(i1, 10), (i2, 180)}. First, we consider the inputs related
to the loan request of customer i1. At time step 1, we have that rcv(i1, 15) and thus the output of
the transducer is lop(i1, 15, t1). This can be derived by using the first rule of Fig. 1 as follows: C is
instantiated with i1 and L with 15 so that the first literal of the body is exactly rcv(i1, 15) and the
second one (namely ¬past_rcv(i1, 15)) is trivially satisfied since, initially, the finite instances of the
relations in state are all assumed to be empty. At time step 1, the function σ adds the tuple (i1, 15) to
the finite instance of past_rcv at time step 0 to obtain the following instance of past_rcv: {(i1, 15)}.
Then, at time step 2, two inputs should be considered: the preparation of the contract prc(i1, 15) and
the internal rating int(i1, 15). By applying the second Datalog rule for prc(i1, 15), it is easy to see that
the output is lop(i1, 15, t2). The attempt to apply the third rule for int(i1, 15) is more interesting:
C is instantiated with i1 and L with 15 so that the first literal of the body is exactly int(i1, 15), the
second literal is satisfied because initially the finite instance of the relation past_int is empty and
no previously applied rule has updated it, the tuple (i1, 10) is in the finite instance of the relation
dbi, but the constraint 10 > 15 is obviously T -unsatisfiable. So, the application of the third rule fails
(modelling the fact that the bank considers too a high risk to give a loan of 15 KEuros to customer
i1) and the corresponding output lop(i1, 15, t3) cannot be produced. No more rules can be applied
for further processing the request of customer i1 and the whole loan origination process cannot be
concluded. (Indeed, inmore realistic models, appropriate corrective tasks should be designed in order
to handle this kind of situations. We do not do this here for the sake of conciseness.)
The loan request for customer i2 is handled in a similar way to that for customer i1 at time step 1
to produce the finite instance lop(i2, 150, t2) at time step 2. Furthermore, the application of the third
rule for i2 is successful: C is instantiatedwith i2 and Lwith 150, the first literal of the body of the rule is
identical to int(i2, 150),¬past_int(i2, 150) is satisfied for reasonswhich are similar to those discussed
above, the tuple (i2, 200) is in the finite instance of dbi, the constraint 200 > 150 is T -satisfiable, and
lop(i2, 150, t3) can be returned as output. For the sake of conciseness, we omit the discussion of the
application of the appropriate Datalog rules of Fig. 1 to verify that the sequence of instances of output
for time steps 3, 4, 5, and 6 correspond to the sequence of instances of input shown in Table 1.
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We remark that, in principle, it is possible to automatically translate an interesting class of
workflows describing business models to constraint spocus transducers.3 We do not investigate this
further here since it is out of the scope of the paper and leave it as an interesting line of future work.
The ability to represent this kind of businessmodels confirms the suitability of the extension of spocus
transducer introduced in Definition 1 for the declarative specifications of (abstractions of) business
models. 
3.1. Verification problems
We focus on the following two verification problems for the constraint spocus transducers of
Definition 1. The first is goal reachability and consists in asking if some goal can be achieved by some
run of the transducer, possibly with some preconditions. For the spocus transducer in Example 1, one
my ask if it is possible to achieve the goal ∃x, y.lop(x, y, t7) ∧ y > 15 as long as ∃x, y.dbi(x, y) ∧ y >
50 ∧ dbe(x, y) ∧ y > 35 holds for the finite instances in db. This verification problem is a first sanity
check on the design of the business model underlying the transducer as the latter is usually conceived
to reach a certain goal. Formally, this problem is stated as follows.
Goal reachability. Given a Σ-theory T , a constraint spocus transducer R whose schema is (input,
state, output, db, log), and a finite instance D of db, does a given sentence γ (called, a goal)
of the form
∃x.
n
j=1
Aj(x)
(where each predicate symbol Aj is inΣ ∪ output , for j = 1, . . . , n) hold in the last output
of some run of R?
So far, the role of the last component of the transducer schema, namely log ⊆ input ∪ output
is unclear. The relations in log are the ones that are considered semantically significant for several
reasons, e.g., theymay result in actionswith important consequences or theymay carry legalmeaning.
The validity of a run of the transducer is defined in terms of the relations in log and the properties that
these satisfy. Statically checking that these properties are satisfied amounts to solving the second
verification problem for relational transducers, called log validity, which is related to fraud detection.
To understand this relationship, consider that – for convenience and efficiency – one might allow
certain customers to conduct business with the supplier by running locally the supplier’s business
model. As a record, the supplier is provided with the log of the run. To detect possible frauds, the
supplier should be able to verify that the log is valid, i.e. the supplier has to verify that there exists
a sequence of inputs that generates the log. If only a subset of all the inputs are logged, the problem
becomes non-trivial for verification but has several advantages for execution, such as a reduction of
the data exchanged over the network. Formally, the problem can be stated as follows.
Log validity. Given a Σ-theory T , a constraint spocus transducer R whose schema is (input, state,
output, db, log), a finite instance D of db, and a finite sequence L1, . . . , Ln, where each Li is a
finite instance of log (for i = 1, . . . , n), does there exist a finite run S1, . . . , Sn of R such that
L1, . . . , Ln = S1|log , . . . , Sn|log?
In Abiteboul et al. (2000), it is shown that both of these problems for spocus transducers are decidable
by a reduction to the satisfiability problem of the BSR class. Here, we prove a similar result for
constraint spocus transducers of Definition 1 by a similar reduction to the satisfiability problem of
BSR(T )-sentences (see below for a formal definition of these formulae).
3 Roughly, such a class of business processes consists of those workflows which do not contain loops (as it is the case of
the loan origination process above) and its importance has been discussed several times in the context of the verification of
web-services (see, e.g., Schlinglof et al. (2005)).
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Theorem 1. Let TS := (input, state, output, db, log) be a transducer schema and T be a Σ-theory such
that (i) the SMT (T ) problem is decidable, (ii) T is locally finite, and (iii) the class of models of T is closed
under sub-structures. Then, the goal reachability and the log validity problems of the constraint spocus
transducers over TS are decidable.
Proof. Two preliminary remarks are in order. First, observe that a finite instance of an n-ary relation
symbol r can be represented by the following BSR formula
∀x.r(x) ↔
m
j=1
x = c j,
where x = x1, . . . , xn is a sequence of variables, c j = c j1, . . . , c jn is a sequence of constants (for
j = 1, . . . ,m) representing the elements in the tuples of the finite instance of r , and x = c j
abbreviates (x1 = c j1 ∧ · · · ∧ xn = c jn). Second, recall (as already observed in the paragraph after
Definition 1) that a set of semi-positive non-recursive constraint Datalog rules defines a mapping
of finite instances of relations occurring in their bodies to finite instances of relations occurring in
their heads (see den Bussche (2000) for details). Symbolically, such amapping can be characterized as
follows. Let π be a rule in a setΠ of semi-positive and non-recursive (constraint) Datalog rules of the
form e(x) ← ni=1 bi(x, y) ∧ ξ(x, y) for ξ a quantifier-free Σ-formula. Then, consider the following
formula
∃y.
n
i=1
bi(x, y) ∧ ξ(x, y)
associated to π and letΠ ′ be the set of formulae associated to all the rules inΠ . According to the first
remark above, a finite instance of the set of predicates occurring inΠ ′ can be represented by a set∆
of BSR formulae of the form ∀x.r(x)↔mj=1 x = c j, for each predicate symbol r inΠ ′. FromΠ ′ ∪∆,
it is possible to derive an equisatisfiable set Λ of formulae consisting of a Boolean combinations of
equalities and constraints (i.e. quantifier-free Σ-formulae as ξ ) by replacing each occurrence of r(z)
in Π ′ with
m
j=1 z = c j for the BSR formula in ∆ corresponding to the instance of r , where z is a
finite sequence of terms. (This process eventually terminates because there are only finitely many
occurrences of predicate symbols and the rules are non-recursive.) By applying this transformation,
the resulting setΛ contains only (possibly existentially quantified)Σ-formulae.
We first consider the log validity problem as goal reachability can be reduced to this problem.
The proof is along the lines of Theorem 3.1 in Abiteboul et al. (2000) for Spocus transducers. A log
L1, . . . , Ln is valid if there exists an input sequence I1, . . . , In generating it. We view I1, . . . , In as a
finite instance of the set of predicate symbols obtained by making n copies of each relation r ∈ input
yielding r1, . . . , rn. To state that the input sequence I1, . . . , In yields the log L1, . . . , Ln, we require that
the relations in I1, . . . , In recorded by the log have the values specified by L1, . . . , Ln together with
the relations in output determined by I1, . . . , In. For input relations, the situation is easy (we analyse
concrete cases as the generalizations are straightforward). For example, suppose that Lj requires that
a tuple c belongs to the relation rj in the input sequence; this can be stated as follows:
∃x.(rj(x) ∧ x = c). (1)
If the log requires that the finite instance of rj is {c, d}, then we can express this as
∀x.(rj(x)→ (x = c ∨ x = d)). (2)
For relations in the output sequence, we substitute each atom containing a predicate symbol in output
with the formula obtained by applying the transformation described above on the finite instances
of the symbols in output and the set of semi-positive and non-recursive (constraint) Datalog rules
specifying the output function of the transducer. The remainder is similar to the case of input relations.
Requiring that a tuple belongs to the instance of a relation rj in the output sequence can be expressed
by a formula similar to (1) except that rj is replaced by the formula obtained by transforming the
constraint Datalog rules of the transducer as described above. Similarly, if the log specifies that the
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instance of a relation rj is {c, d}, the inclusion of rj in the log is stated by a formula which is similar to
(2) except that – again – rj is replaced by the formula obtained by the transformation process described
above.
For the goal reachability problem, the reduction is similar to what we have discussed for the
log validity problem. Preliminarily, observe that only runs of length two need to be considered. To
understandwhy this is so, consider an input sequence I1, . . . , Inwithn > 2. Since outputs dependonly
on the current input, the database, and the state relations (storing the union of all previous inputs),
the last output in the run of the transducer on I1, . . . , In is the same as the last output in the run of the
same transducer on the following input sequence of length 2: (I1 ∪ · · · ∪ In−1), In. At this point, the
problem is reduced to that of the satisfiability of a formula along the lines described before.
All the formulae obtained above belong to a particular class, which is an extension of BSR with
constraints. Under the hypotheses in the statement of the theorem, it is possible to show that the
satisfiability of formulae in such a class is decidable. In the next section, we precisely define the class
of formulae considered here and show the decidability of their satisfiability problem. 
4. The satisfiability problem of BSR formulae with constraints
Wegive the formal definition of the class of sentences towhich all the formulae derived in the proof
of Theorem 1 belong. Such a class of formulae and the related decidability result may be relevant also
for other verification problems (see, e.g., Piskac et al. (2010) for ideas about reducing some verification
problems to the satisfiability of formulae in the BSR class).
Definition 2. Let T be aΣ-theory and R a tuple of predicate symbols. A BSR(T )-sentence is a formula
of the form
∃x.∀y.ϕ(x, y)
where ϕ is a quantifier-freeΣR-formula,ΣR := Σ ∪ R, andΣ ∩ R = ∅.4
We say that a BSR(T )-sentence ψ is T-satisfiable (or, simply, satisfiable when T is clear from the
context) iff there exists aΣR-structureM which satisfies ψ and whose reductM|Σ is in Mod(T ).
The assumption of the disjointness betweenΣ and R is tomodel the fact that the theory T is supposed
to characterize (a class of) ‘‘primitive’’ constraint domains to be used without modifications. It is also
one of the key assumptions of ourmain decidability result (Theorem2 below). If T is the empty theory,
then BSR(T )-sentences are BSR formulae.
We show the decidability of BSR(T )-sentences under the hypotheses on the theory T stated in
Theorem1 in two steps. First, we eliminate universal quantifiers by identifying finitelymany instances
which are sufficient for satisfiability checking (under suitable hypotheses). Second, we show the
decidability of the resulting quantifier-free formulae.
Lemma 1 (Instantiation). Let T be a locally finite Σ-theory and the class of models of T be closed under
sub-structures. The BSR(T )-sentence
∃x.∀y.ϕ(x, y) (3)
is satisfiable iff it is satisfiable in a finite model iff the quantifier-free formula
σ
ϕ(x, yσ) (4)
is satisfiable, where σ ranges over the substitutions mapping the variables y into the set of representative
Σ(x)-terms.
4 Avoiding to consider constants not in Σ to occur in ϕ is w.l.o.g. In fact, if ϕ contains a constant c ∉ Σ , it is sufficient to
build the formula ϕ′ by replacing all occurrences of c in ϕ with a fresh variable – say z – and to existentially quantify it; in this
way, we obtain the equisatisfiable formula ∃z.∃x.∀y.ϕ′ . It is easy to see that we derive an equisatisfiable BSR(T )-sentence, if we
repeat this process for each constant not inΣ .
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Proof. W.l.o.g. assume that the length of x is strictly greater than 0; this avoids to consider structures
with empty domains. First, we show that
(3) is satisfiable⇔ (4) is satisfiable.
The⇒-side of the equivalence is trivial. So, we focus on the⇐-side: we assume the satisfiability of (4)
and show the satisfiability of (3). Since (4) is satisfiable, by Definition 2, we have that
M |= ∃x.

σ
ϕ(x, yσ),
for some ΣR-structureM such thatM|Σ ∈ Mod(T ). We can find a mapping v assigning elements of
the domain D ofM to the variables in x, in such a way that
M, v |=

σ
ϕ(x, yσ).
Now, consider the model M′ obtained from M as follows. Let the domain D′ of M′ be the set of
elements in D which are the images of the variables in x according to the assignment v above.
Furthermore, let the interpretation of M′ be obtained from that of M by restricting it to D′; this is
possible because of the following two observations. First, by Definition 2, ϕmay contain only symbols
(in particular constants or functions, if any) inΣR. Thus, the domain ofM is the same of that ofM|Σ .
Second, since the Σ-theory T is locally finite (by assumption), there are only finitely many ground
representative terms t1, . . . , tka , for the set a ⊆ Σ of constants occurring in ϕ, such that T |= u = ti
for i ∈ {1, . . . , ka}, for every ground Σ-term u. Thus, once the formula ϕ is given and despite the
fact that function symbols may belong to Σ , it is always possible to find a term from a finite set of
representatives which is equivalent to any term in a (possibly infinite) set. Now, by construction of
M′, we have that
M′, v |=

σ
ϕ(x, yσ);
furthermore, since ϕ is quantifier-free and, varying σ , the elements assigned to the terms yσ cover all
the y-tuples of elements in the domain D′ ofM′, we have that
M′, v |= ∀y.ϕ(x, y).
To conclude that (3) is T -satisfiable – thereby showing the equivalence of the satisfiability of (3) and (4)
– observe that, by construction,M′|Σ is a substructure ofM|Σ and since Mod(T ) is closed under sub-
structures, by assumption, we have thatM′|Σ ∈ Mod(T ). Hence,M′ is a sub-structure ofM because
the domain of M′ is the same of that of M′|Σ , the interpretations in M′ of the symbols in Σ are
restrictions of their interpretations inM (sinceM′|Σ is a substructure ofM|Σ ), and the interpretations
of the predicate symbols of R inM′ are also restrictions of those inM. Finally, since the modelM′ is
finite (as its reductM′|Σ is a model of the locally finite theory T which is generated by finitely many
elements), the above also proves the remaining equivalence, i.e. (3) is satisfiable iff it is satisfiable in
a finite model. 
We are left with the problem of showing the decidability of the satisfiability of quantifier-free
formulae overΣR.
Theorem 2 (Decidability). Let T be a locally finite Σ-theory whose class of models is closed under sub-
structures, the SMT(T ) problem be decidable, and R be a finite set of predicate symbols such thatΣ∩R = ∅.
Then, the satisfiability of BSR(T )-sentences is decidable.
The assumption of the background theory T to be locally finite, at first, seems to be quite restrictive.
However, transducers are a specification framework for expressing designs at a very high-level
of abstraction. So, although locally finite theories allow us to describe abstractions with a simple
algebraic structure, we believe that this class of theories can be put to productive use in this context
(as shown in Example 1). We will see how to overcome this restriction in Section 5 below.
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In the proof of the theorem above, we will make use of the decidability of the problem of checking
the satisfiability of quantifier-free formulae over a signature which is larger than the signature of a
theory with decidable SMT problem. In the literature, this result has been derived in several papers,
e.g., Ganzinger (2002), Ganzinger et al. (2004) and Tinelli and Zarba (2005). We will make use of the
statement in Tinelli and Zarba (2005), which is easily applicable to our situation.
Theorem 3 (Tinelli and Zarba, 2005). Let T be a Σ-theory such that the quantifier-free satisfiability
problem of T is decidable. Then, for every signature Σ ′ ⊇ Σ , the quantifier-free satisfiability problem
of T with respect toΣ ′-formulae is decidable.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 2 above.
Proof. By Lemma 1, given a satisfiability problem for a BSR(T )-sentence of the form (3), we equiva-
lently consider the satisfiability of a formula of the form (4). Since existentially quantified variables in
x can be regarded as Skolem constants, we are left with the problem of checking the T -satisfiability of
the quantifier-free (ΣR ∪ x)-formula
ψ :=

σ
ϕ(x, yσ),
where σ ranges over the mapping from y to the set of representativeΣ(x)-terms and the variables in
x are considered as ‘‘fresh’’ constants. Now, apply Theorem 3 with T = T and Σ ′ = ΣR ∪ x: by as-
sumption, the SMT(T ) problem is decidable or, equivalently, the quantifier-free satisfiability problem
of T is so. Thus, we are entitled to conclude the decidability of ψ as desired. 
5. Security-aware transducers
Wenow extend constraint spocus transducers (Definition 1)with access control engines to enforce
authorization constraints, which play a significant role for security-sensitive business processes.
In fact, failure to meet authorization constraints may lead to economic losses and even to legal
implications; see, e.g., Armando and Ponta (2009) for an extensive discussion on this issue. It is
thus crucial to be able to complete the specification of workflows with the associated access control
engines to obtain more accurate models and enable the verification of important security properties.
In the context of the approach taken in this paper to specify business processes, it is particularly
easy to use (possibly recursive) constraint Datalog rules to formalize authorization constraints.
Besides facilitating the specification of access control engines when combined with constraint spocus
transducers, there are two other reasons for which constraint Datalog languages are a natural choice
as access control languages. First, they have been identified as the foundational framework for access
control (Li and Mitchell, 2003a) because several languages in this class, such as Binder (DeTreville,
2002), the family of RT languages (Li and Mitchell, 2003b), Cassandra (Becker, 2005), SecPal (Becker
et al., 2010), and DKAL (Gurevich and Neeman, 2008) can be reduced to suitable instances of
constraint Datalog. In certain cases, e.g., Binder or SecPal, the semantics of the languages are given
by translations to suitable constraint Datalog programs. Second, constraint Datalog supports the
declarative specifications of a wide range of policy idioms, i.e. general patterns that frequently appear
in access control policies and thus allow the specifier to adopt the most suitable access control
model for the application under consideration (see, e.g., Becker (2005) for a collection of declarative
specifications of such idioms). Notice that key to expressiveness is recursion, which is needed, e.g.,
to encode permission inheritance or role delegation (see, e.g., Becker (2005)). case We will see an
example of the need of recursion for modelling role inheritance in the continuation of Example 1
below (Example 2). In this context, the challenge is to design automated verification techniques for
this new class of transducerswhichmay contain recursive rules.Wewill see that this is possible under
suitable assumptions, which are similar to those of Theorem 1.
We now introduce the extension of the transducers in Definition 1. Preliminarily, we define
the notion of security transducer schema as a tuple (input, state, output, db, policy, log), where each
element of the tuple is a finite set of predicate symbols; input , state, output , policy, and db are pairwise
disjoint and log ⊆ input ∪ output .
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Fig. 2. A security-aware spocus transducer.
Definition 3. Let STS := (input, state, output, db, policy, log) be a security transducer schema and T
be aΣ-theory with decidable SMT (T ) problem such thatΣ ∩ X = ∅when X is a component of STS. A
security-aware spocus transducer is a relational transducer (STS, σ , ω) such that state = {past_R | R ∈
input} where past_R has the same arity of R and for every finite instance It of input , finite instance St
of state, finite instance D of db, and integer t ≥ 1, we have
• σ(It , St−1,D)(past_R) = St−1(past_R) ∪ It(R), for each R ∈ input;
• ω(It , St−1,D) is defined by a finite setΩ ∪Π of constraint Datalog rules such that
– Ω is a set of semi-positive and non-recursive ruleswhose heads contain only predicate symbols
from output , whose body contain predicate symbols from state ∪ db ∪ policy, and a quantifier-
freeΣ-formula as constraint, and
– Π is a set of (possibly recursive) rules, whose heads contain only predicate symbols from
policy, whose bodies contain predicate symbols from state ∪ db ∪ policy, and quantifier-free
Σ-formulae as constraints.
(The semantics of Ω ∪ Π is the standard one for recursive constraint Datalog programs, see,
e.g., Toman (1997).)
The structure of a security-aware spocus transducer is depicted in Fig. 2. By assuming policy = ∅
(i.e. we consider only the part of Fig. 2 in the dotted box), it is easy to see that security-aware
spocus transducers reduce to spocus transducer with constraints as specified by Definition 1. The goal
reachability and the log validity problems for the newly introduced class of transducers are the same
as those for spocus transducers with constraints.
To illustrate the notion of security-aware transducer, let us consider again the loan origination
process of Example 1wherewe have abstracted away an important part of the system: the assignment
of users to tasks for their execution. In fact, the bank running the loan origination process is interested
in enforcing that only the employees in certain positions can perform some tasks requiring a higher
clearance level. For example, while a task like rcv can be executed by any employee since it consists
only of collecting some data about a customer, the task dec is muchmore delicate and only a manager
or a supervisor should be able to execute it. As discussed above, this kind of authorization constraints
should be enforced by an access control engine, responsible for granting or denying an employee the
possibility to execute a task based on his/her credentials. In the literature, one of the most popular
models for access control is Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) (Sandhu et al., 1996), which regulates
access through roles.
A role (from a set R) associates certain permissions (from a set P) to some users (of a setU) by using
the following two relations: UA ⊆ U × R and PA ⊆ R × P . Roles are structured hierarchically so as
to permit permission inheritance, i.e. a role acquires all the permissions associated to the roles which
are lower in the hierarchy. Formally, a role hierarchy is a partial order ≽ on R, where r1 ≽ r2 means
that r1 is ‘‘more senior than’’ r2 for r1, r2 ∈ R. A user u is an explicit member of role r when (u, r) ∈ UA
while u is an implicit member of r if there exists r ′ ∈ R such that r ′ ≽ r and (u, r ′) ∈ UA. Given UA
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Role hierarchy Relation PA
dir
↙↘
man sup
↘↙
emp
Role Permission to execute task
emp t1
emp t2
sup t3 if loan≥ 20 KEuros
emp t3 if loan< 20 KEuros
sup t4
sup t5
man t6
emp t7
Fig. 3. The RBAC policy for the loan origination process.
and PA, a user u ‘‘has permission’’ p if there exists a role r ∈ R such that (p, r) ∈ PA and u is a member
of r , either explicit or implicit.
We are now ready to instantiate the notion of security-aware transducer to specify the loan
origination process of Fig. 1 augmented with an access control engine based on the RBAC model.
Example 2. We consider the access control policy depicted in Fig. 3. On the left, the role hierarchy
is shown where an arrow from r1 to r2 means that role r1 is more senior than role r2. Formally, let
R := {emp, sup,man, dir}where empdenotes the role of (simple) employee, sup the role of supervisor,
man the role of manager, and dir the role of director of the bank. According to the figure, we have that
dir is more senior than man and sup which, in turn, are both more senior than emp. On the right of
Fig. 3, the tabular representation of the relation PA is shown, where P := {t1, . . . , t7} and by abuse
of notation, ti denotes the permission to execute the task ti for i ∈ {1, . . . , 7}. As it is customary
in several applications of RBAC, the relation PA is defined in terms of the values of some auxiliary
attributes besides the elements in U and R. For the loan origination process, we have that certain
tasks can be executed by employees with roles which are less senior if the loan amount is lower than
a certain value. According to the table, we have, for example, that (sup, t3) ∈ PA if the amount of the
loan is bigger than (or equal to) 20 KEuros.
We consider a security transducer schema STS := (input, state, output, db, policy, log) where
input , state, db, and log are as in Example 1 (although, as we will see below, we add one argument
to each predicate symbols in input ∪ state ∪ log while leaving unchanged the arities of those in
db) and policy := {ua, pa, can}. It is easy to formalize the RBAC policy of Fig. 3 by a set Π :=
Πrh ∪Πua ∪Πpa ∪ {β} of constraint Datalog rules, where the rules inΠrh are derived from the graph
of the relation ‘more senior than’ depicted on the left of Fig. 3:
ua(E, sup) ← ua(E, dir) ua(E,man) ← ua(E, dir)
ua(E, emp) ← ua(E, sup) ua(E, emp) ← ua(E,man).
Notice that Πrh is recursive as anticipated above when discussing the specification of permission
inheritance according to a role hierarchy. The base of the recursion will be the set Πua of facts
induced by the initial user-role assignment relation modelling explicit membership of users to
roles. For example, if U := {u1, . . . , u6}, then we may have Πua := {ua(ui, emp)|i = 1, 2, 3} ∪
{ua(u4,man), ua(u5, sup), ua(u6, dir)}. In this situation, we can derive that ua(u6, r) for each r ∈ R,
i.e. that the director of the bank can execute any task of the workflow since his/her role is more senior
than any other role in R. Finally, the setΠpa specifies the relation PA on the right of Fig. 3 and contains
the following facts and rules: pa(emp, t1, L), pa(emp, t2, L),
pa(sup, t3, L) ← L ≥ 20, pa(emp, t3, L) ← L < 20,
pa(sup, t4, L), pa(sup, t5, L), and pa(emp, t7, L). Notice that pa is ternary because the relation PA is
parametrized with respect to the employee, the role, and the amount of the loan so as to allow for
a more flexible assignment of the roles depending on the particular instance of the loan origination
process. Also, notice thatΠpa contains constraints. We need onemore rule, identified with β , which is
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responsible for querying the policy engine and to establish if a certain employee is entitled to execute
a certain task:
can(E, T )← ua(E, R), pa(R, T ).
This rule formalizes the notion of ‘‘a user having a certain permission’’ (in our application, the
permission to execute a certain task) as introduced above when briefly describing the main
components of the RBAC model.
We are left with the problem of combining the specifications of the workflow of Fig. 1 and of
the access control engine considered here to build the specification of a security-aware transducer
(STS, σ , ω). In order to specify the functions σ and ω, we now need to define (a) the arity of the
predicates in input , state, output , db, and log and (b) the rules inΩ . Concerning (a), we extend the arity
of the predicate symbols in input (and thus also of state), output , and log , with an additional parameter
for the employee who has potentially been assigned (has performed, respectively) the execution of
a certain task. So, for example, the predicate rcv is now ternary rcv(C, L, E), where C is the unique
identifier of the customer, L is the amount of the loan, and E is the unique identifier of the employee
who has potentially the responsibility of the execution of the task; the output predicate lop is now of
arity four, i.e. lop(C, L, T , E), and denotes the fact that the employee E has executed the task T of the
loan origination process concerning the customer C who has asked for a loan of amount L. Concerning
(b), we obtain the set Ω of semi-positive and non-recursive constraint Datalog rules modelling the
workflow of Fig. 1 by adding the extra parameter E and the pre-condition can(E, T ) to the body of
each rule. For example, the first and the third rules now become:
lop(C, L, t1, E) ← rcv(C, L, E),¬p_rcv(C, L, E), can(E, t1)
lop(C, L, t3, E) ← int(C, L, E),¬p_int(C, L, E), can(E, t3),
dbi(C,M),M > L.
The other rules in Fig. 1 are modified in a similar way. This concludes the specification of the security-
aware transducer modelling the workflow and the access control engine of the loan origination
process. To keep the paper to a reasonable length, we observe – without providing the details – that
the run of the transducer in Table 1 is also a run of the security-aware transducer defined here when
an appropriate choice of the employees in U is performed. 
5.1. Handling recursive policy rules
As pointed out above, the difficulty to solve both the goal reachability and the log validity problems
is the presence of recursive rules in the setΠ of a security-aware transducer (Definition 3). In fact, a
reduction to the satisfiability problem of BSR(T )-sentences is less straightforward than that proposed
in the proof of Theorem 1. To understand the problem, consider the following recursive set of Datalog
rules:
p(x, y)← q(x, y)
p(x, y)← q(x, z), p(z, y)
which is intended to define the transitive closure p of the binary relation q. It is no longer possible
to characterize the mapping from instances of q to instances of p by a formula not containing q. In
fact, taking the disjunction of the bodies of the rules – as done for the non-recursive rules in the
proof of Theorem 1 – yields a formula that still contains an occurrence of p because of the second rule
above. We need to compute a formula not containing p that characterizes the least transitive relation
containing p or, equivalently, its fix-point. While this is always possible for recursive Datalog rules
(as those considered above), this is no more the case when considering constraints; see, e.g., Toman
(1997). Fortunately, it is possible to identify sufficient conditions on the Σ-theory T to guarantee
the existence of a formula characterizing the fix-point of a set of recursive constraint Datalog rules.
Formally, we adapt the approach described in Li and Mitchell (2003a) to our framework.
We assume that the Σ-theory T also admits quantifier elimination. We regard each symbolic
representation of a finite instance of a relation r (recall the first observation at the beginning of the
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function constraintFixPoint(F , R)
1 results ←− F ; Changed ←− true;
2 while Changed do
3 Changed ←− false
4 foreach rule ∈ R do
5 foreach tuple of constraint facts constructed from results do
6 newres ←− constraint facts obtained by constraint rule
application between rule and tuple
7 foreach fact ∈ newres do
8 if (results |̸= fact) then results ←− results ∪ {fact};
9 Changed ←− true;
10 end
11 end
12 end
13 end
14 return results
Fig. 4. Least fix-point computation of constraint Datalog rules: F is a set of constraint facts and R is a set of constraint Datalog
rules.
Source: Adapted from Li and Mitchell (2003a).
proof of Theorem 1) as a constraint fact, i.e. ∀x.r(x)↔mj=1 x = c j is transformed into the constraint
Datalog rule r(x) ← mj=1 x = c j, where x is a tuple of variables and c j is a tuple of constants, for
j = 1, . . . ,m. Let r0(x) ← ni=1 ri(x) ∧ ξ0(x) be a constraint Datalog rule and ri(xki) ← ξi(xki) be a
constraint fact for ξi a Σ(xki)-quantifier-free formula, ki the arity of ri, and i = 1, . . . , n. A constraint
rule application produces m ≥ 0 facts of the form r0(x) ← ξ ′j (x) where ξ ′j is a quantifier-free Σ(x)-
formula for j = 1, . . . ,m (m ≥ 0) andmj=1 ξ ′j is equivalent (by the elimination of quantifiers in T ) to
the formula
∃y.

n
i=1
ξi(xki) ∧ ξ0(x)

,
where y is the tuple of variables occurring in the body of the rule but not in the head. Now, we are
in the position to describe the algorithm to compute the least fix-point of a set of constraint Datalog
rules (see Fig. 4) (Li and Mitchell, 2003a). The crux is the termination of the algorithm in Fig. 4. In
fact, if the function constraintFixPoint terminates, it is again possible to replace each occurrence of
the symbols in bi’s of the constraint query associated to the rules with the constraint instances of
the relations obtained from the set of constraint facts computed by constraintFixPoint. The function
constraintFixPoint terminates when all derivable new facts are implied by previously derived facts so
that the least fix-point is reached.5 The additional requirement made in this section that T admits
elimination of quantifiers is unfortunately not sufficient to guarantee termination. We need the
following notion which is adapted from Toman (1997).
Definition 4. Let T be a Σ-theory and x be a finite set of variables. If for every (possibly infinite) T -
satisfiable set S ofΣ(x)-constraint, there exists a finite subset Sfin ⊆ S such that for every ξ in S, there
exists a ξ ′ in Sfin for which ∀x.ξ (x) → ξ ′(x) is T -valid, then T is said to be constraint compact. If Sfin
is effectively computable from S, then T is said to be effectively constraint compact (in the following,
when we say ‘constraint compact,’ we in fact always mean ‘effectively constraint compact’).
Constraint compactness is a sufficient condition for the termination of the algorithm in Fig. 4.
5 The test at line 8 can be reduced (by eliminating quantifiers) to a T -satisfiability test on a conjunction of two quantifier-
freeΣ-formulae. To understand how, consider two facts r1(x)← ξ1(x) and r2(y)← ξ2(y). To check that the latter is a logical
consequence of the former (modulo T ), sufficient to check the T -validity of∀x.ξ1(x)→ ∀y.ξ2(y). By refutation, this is equivalent
to checking the T -unsatisfiability of the negation of the previous formula, which, by eliminating quantifiers can be reduced to
a quantifier-free formula.
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Theorem 4 (Toman, 1997). Let T be a constraint compact theory. Then, the algorithm in Fig. 4 terminates
for every query.
The sketch of the proof is as follows. By contradiction, assume that the algorithm does not terminate.
Thus, every iteration of the loop produces at least one fact which is not a consequence of those which
were already derived. Since there are only finitely many different predicate symbols, there must be at
least one such symbol for which the algorithm derives an infinite set S of facts. But, T is assumed to
be constraint compact and so we can replace S with a finite subset Sfin such that the facts in S \ Sfin are
consequence of those in Sfin. As the algorithm checks for the logical consequence of newly derived facts
before adding it to the resulting set of derived facts, all the facts in S \ Sfin should not be considered:
a contradiction.
Interestingly, locally finite theories are also constraint compact.
Proposition 1. If T is an (effectively) locally finite theory, then it is also (effectively) constraint compact.
Proof. Let S be a set of constraints over a finite set x of variables. Then, since the theory T is locally
finite, there exists a finite set RTerms of Σ(x)-terms such that for every term u in S, there exists
t ∈ RTerms, T |= u = t . By using the terms in RTerms and the finite signature Σ , it is possible to
build only finitely many distinctΣ(x)-atoms ξ1(x), . . . , ξn(x) (also called representative atoms) such
that for any furtherΣ(x)-atom ξ(x), there exists i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, T |= ∀x.ξi(x)↔ ξ(x). If we consider
aΣ(x)-constraint φ(x), it is possible to collect all the atoms occurring in it, say {α1, . . . , αm}; for each
αj (for j = 1, . . . ,m), find the equivalent representative atom ξkj , and then substitute each αj with
the corresponding ξkj in φ and then eliminating duplicates. The result will be a constraint taken from
the finitely many distinct conjunctions of literals built out of the finitely many representative atoms
ξ1(x), . . . , ξn(x). This can be generalized to sets of constraints in the obvious way. Clearly, this implies
the constraint compactness of T . 
As an immediate consequence of the last two facts we obtain the following result.
Corollary 1. Let T be an (effectively) locally finite theory that admits elimination of quantifiers. Then, the
algorithm in Fig. 4 terminates for every query.
This will be a crucial ingredient in the reduction of goal reachability and log validity problems to the
satisfiability of BSR(T )-sentences.
Theorem 5. Let STS := (input, state, output, db, policy, log) be a security transducer schema and T be
a locally finite Σ-theory admitting elimination of quantifiers whose class of models is closed under sub-
structures. The goal reachability and log validity problems of security-aware spocus transducers over STS
are decidable.
Proof. The proof is along the lines of that of Theorem1, except for the handling of recursive constraint
Datalog rules associated to the policies of the security-aware transducer. As before,we consider the log
validity problem first as goal reachability can be reduced to it (for this, see the proof Theorem 1). A log
L1, . . . , Ln is valid if there exists an input sequence I1, . . . , In generating it. We view I1, . . . , In as finite
instances of the predicate symbols in input obtained by making n copies of each relation r ∈ input
yielding r1, . . . , rn. To state that the input sequence I1, . . . , In yields the log L1, . . . , Ln, we require
that the relations in I1, . . . , In recorded by the log have the values specified by L1, . . . , Ln together
with the relations in output determined by I1, . . . , In. For input relations, the situation is the the same
of the proof in Theorem 1. For relation in the output sequence, we resort to Corollary 1: the fix-point
algorithm in Fig. 4 terminates on all queries and generates a (finite) set of constraint facts. Then, for
each fact of the form rj(x) ← ξ ij (x) in the output set, we take the disjunction of all ξ ij for i ≥ 0. Let
ϕj(x) be the resulting quantifier-free Σ(x)-formula. The remainder of the proof proceeds along the
lines of what is done for input relations (see again the proof of Theorem 1). It is not difficult to see
that the resulting formula is a BSR(T )-sentence and its satisfiability is equivalent to the existence of
an input sequence yielding the desired log. Applying Theorem 2 concludes the proof.
As a final remark,we notice that it is possible to optimize the fix-point computation since the trans-
ducers we are considering are cumulative and, beside those in policy, only predicate symbols from
state (or db that do not change over time and are thus unproblematic) are allowed. As a consequence,
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it is useless to compute for each point in the sequence the fix-point for the policy part from scratch.
Instead, it is possible to store the fix-point at a certain state and then incrementally compute the fix-
point for the next point in the sequence by considering only the newly introduced tuple(s) inserted
from the input relation(s). As the starting point for this optimization, one can take one of the many
algorithms available in saturation-based theorem provers for the computation of the closure of a set
of clauses under a set of inference rules (see, e.g., Weidenbach (2001) for details). 
5.2. Security-aware transducers with more expressive constraint domains
One may wonder about the scope of applicability of the decidability result in Theorem 5. In fact,
it is difficult to find theories that are both locally finite and admit quantifier elimination. In fact, the
former is obtained for theories with a ‘‘simple algebraic structure’’ while the latter is satisfied for
those with a ‘‘rich algebraic structure’’. To illustrate, we consider three theories that are relevant for
the specification of business processes as security-aware transducers.
• The theory Ted (of an enumerateddata-type)whose signature contains only the constants c1, . . . , cn
and axiomatized by the following sentences:
ci ≠ cj for i, j = 1, . . . , n and i ≠ j
∀x.(x = c1 ∨ · · · ∨ x = cn),
is both locally finite and admits quantifier elimination. This theory is useful, for example, in the
specification of the finitely many roles that a user of a system can assume in RBAC (see Example 2
above).
• The theory Tlo of linear orders whose signature contains the binary relation ≼ and is axiomatized
by the following sentences:
∀x, y, z.(x ≼ y ∧ y ≼ z → x ≼ z) ∀x, y.(x ≼ y ∧ y ≼ x → x = y)
∀x.x ≼ x ∀x, y.(x ≼ y ∨ y ≼ x)
is locally finite – as it is axiomatized by universal sentences (Chang andKeisler, 1990) – and its class
of models is closed under substructures, the SMT(Tlo) problem is decidable, but it does not admit
quantifier elimination. This theory (with its extensions) is ubiquitous in applications requiring, for
example, the specification of temporal constraints indicating the validity of certain certificates or
credentials. Another use of (an extension of) Tlo is in Example 1 above.• The theory Tdlo of dense linear orders is the theory over the same signature of Tlo and obtained by
adding the following two sentences to the set of axioms of Tlo:
∀x, y.(x ≺ y → ∃z.(x ≺ z ∧ z ≼ y)) and ∃x, y.x ≠ y,
where t1 ≺ t2 abbreviates t1 ≼ t2 ∧ t1 ≠ t2 for t1, t2 variables. The SMT(Tdlo) problem is decidable,
Tdlo admits elimination of quantifiers, but it is not locally finite. The theory is important for the
same kind of specifications in which the theory Tlo is used.
Notice how Tlo and Tdlo are both relevant but not sufficient for the application of Theorem 5. On the
one hand, Tlo is locally finite but does not admit quantifier elimination. On the other hand, Tdlo admits
quantifier elimination but it is not locally finite. Interestingly, it is possible to show (see, e.g., Chang
and Keisler (1990)) that Tlo and Tdlo are such that a quantifier-free formula is Tlo-satisfiable iff it is Tdlo-
satisfiable. This allows us to check the satisfiability of BSR(Tlo)-sentences, we can use its being locally
finite to apply the instantiation procedure underlying the proof of Theorem 5 while we can use the
fact that Tdlo admits elimination of quantifiers to obtain the termination of the fix-point algorithm in
Fig. 4—as we know that the Tlo-satisfiability of quantifier-free formulae is preserved. In other words,
it is possible to reconcile the local finiteness of Tlo with the existence of a quantifier elimination
procedure for Tdlo. This phenomenon is not an accident but an application of the notion of model
completeness (Chang and Keisler, 1990).
AΣ-theory T ismodel complete iff, for all modelsM,N of T , ifM is a sub-structure ofN , thenM
is also an elementary sub-structure of N , i.e. for every Σ-formula ϕ(x) and all elements a, we have
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thatM |= ϕ(a) iff N |= ϕ(a). Intuitively, the elementary sub-modelM of a model N preserves the
set of satisfiable first-order formulae (and hence of quantifier-free formulae in particular). If T is a
theory, the set of universal sentences which are T -valid is denoted with T∀. Notice that the validity of
universal sentences is the dual of the satisfiability of quantifier-free formulae.
Now, it is well-known that Tdlo is model complete (see, e.g., Chang and Keisler (1990)). The key
property (see Remark 3.5.6 in Chang and Keisler (1990)) is that M is a sub-model of the set of
universal sentences which are logical consequences of Tdlo iff M is a sub-model of some model of
T∀dlo. Since T
∀
dlo = T∀lo (see Ghilardi (2004)) and there exists a quantifier elimination procedure that
returns formulae containing no new symbols with respect to the input formulae—this can be derived
by inspecting the procedure in, e.g., Chang and Keisler (1990), we have formally justified the use of
Tlo in Theorem 5 and that of Tdlo to eliminate quantifiers in the algorithm of Fig. 4. Collecting these
observations, we can prove the following decidability result for the verification of security-aware
spocus transducers with richer algebraic structures as constraint domains.
Theorem 6. Let STS := (input, state, output, db, log) be a security transducer schema and T be a Σ-
theory such that
• the SMT (T ) problem is decidable,
• it is locally finite,
• the class of models of T is closed under sub-structures,
• T∗ ⊇ T admits quantifier elimination and it is such that for every formula ϕ(x), there exists a T-
equivalent quantifier-free formula ϕ′(x) such that the set Sϕ ⊆ Σ of symbols occurring in ϕ is a super-
set of the set Sϕ′ ⊆ Σ of symbols occurring in ϕ′ (or, equivalently, Sϕ ⊇ Sϕ′ ), and
• T∀ = T∀∗ .
Then, the reachability and log validity problems for the security-aware spocus transducer over STS are
decidable.
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Theorem 5. The only difference is the use of T∗ instead of T when
computing the fix-point of the recursive constraint Datalog rules of the policies of a security-aware
transducer. By assumption, the formulae returned by the quantifier elimination procedure of T∗ do
not contain new symbols ofΣ with respect to those occurring in the original quantified formula. As a
consequence, the argument of Corollary 1 for the termination of the algorithm of Fig. 4 still works and
we are able to compute a formula ψ characterizing a fix-point in finitely many steps. Since ψ ∈ T∀∗
and T∀∗ = T∀ (as any theory admitting quantifier elimination is model complete (Chang and Keisler,
1990)), the formula ψ is also in T∀. 
6. Conclusions and future work
We have introduced two classes of relational transducers (Abiteboul et al., 2000) and studied
sufficient conditions under which the goal reachability and the log validity for these transducers
are decidable. The first extension adds constraints that can be used to specify an abstraction of
the algebraic structure of certain data. Decidability for this class is shown by a reduction to the
satisfiability problem of an extension of the BSR class with constraints, called BSR(T ) for T being
a theory characterizing a class of constraint domains. The second extension adds recursive rules
for the specification of access control policies that are crucial to specify certain policy idioms, such
as delegation or permission inheritance. Decidability for this second class is obtained by extending
the reduction for the first class of transducers with a fix-point computation to handle recursive
rules. Since the sufficient conditions for termination of the fix-point computation are restrictive, we
have investigated how these can be relaxed using the notion of model-theoretic notion of model
completeness. These results allow us to derive the decidability of two important verification problems
for the class of security-aware relational transducers, namely goal reachability—which permits the
validation of the executability of certain scenarios – and log validity – which is the basis of fraud
detection. Since we work in a framework closely related to that of constraint Datalog rules that lies
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at the core of many languages for specifying access control policies, we hope that our results will be
useful starting points for the design of analysis techniques for these languages.
There are two main lines of future work. First, we intend to study the decidability of those verifi-
cation problems involving two or more transducers such as containment and equivalence (Abiteboul
et al., 2000). Second, it would be interesting to see how to implement the algorithm for checking
the satisfiability of the extension of the BSR class on top of state-of-the-art Automated Theorem
Provers (ATPs) or Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMT) solvers. In particular, the ATP SPASS (Weiden-
bach, 2001) and the SMT solver Z3 (Z3, 2011), with their support for the BSR class and its extensions
(see, e.g., Suda et al. (2010), Hillenbrand and Weidenbach (2007) and de Moura and Bjørner (2008))
seem to be ideal candidates to smoothly combine reasoning in BSR and about constraints required for
the kind of verification problems considered in this paper.
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